By Ostap Hrynchak
Introduction
At a time of significant global transformation, renewed and growing interest in the Arctic’s strategic and commercial potential is evolving rapidly as environmental conditions shift. The region has the potential to become a key arena for great-power competition and social disruption in the coming decades. While the region was characterised for decades as a zone of peace and cooperation, escalating geopolitical tension, specifically following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has precipitated a surge in military investment and strategic rivalry. For the Russian Federation, the Arctic has transitioned from a peripheral frontier into the gravitational centre of its national security architecture and economic future. Moscow has increasingly adopted an “Arctic First” doctrine, framing the region as an existential “strategic bastion” designed to protect its nuclear deterrent and provide a primary resource base for its economic development plans.
Strategic Bastion: The Infrastructure of Deterrence
The Russian Federation’s military posture is underpinned by the “Strategic Bastion” concept, a defence architecture designed to ensure the survival of its sea-based nuclear deterrent, namely the Northern Fleet, while enforcing sovereignty over the northern frontier. For the Kremlin, the reduction in polar ice does not solely represent an economic opportunity in the form of the Northern Sea Route but also increased security concerns from potential NATO presence in the region. When considering the recent accession of Sweden and Finland into the Alliance, the concerns have only grown louder.
Focusing on the military presence in the region, the Northern Fleet and the Russian Coast Guard currently oversee a network of airfields across the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). These facilities primarily support search and rescue (SAR) missions, military logistics and resupply operations. Since 2014, 14 such airfields have been constructed or rebuilt, with plans to develop new airstrips in Chokurdy, Kigely and Taymylyan to support SAR. Diving deeper into Russia’s permanent military presence in the Arctic are three key bases, which are at the centre of its operations. Situated on Alexandra Land Island—known as the “Arctic Shamrock” base near Nagurskoye in Franz Josef Land—on Kotelny Island in the New Siberian Islands (the “Northern Clover” base in the Laptev Sea), and at Rogachevo on Novaya Zemlya. These bases are strategically positioned and play a vital role in the Bastion defence concept by enhancing Russia’s ability to deter and counter potential foreign military activity. More recently, they have also aided in Russia’s protection of the so-called “shadow” ships that have fallen under international sanctions. Often, these fall into the non-ice class, thereby increasing risks of environmental catastrophe in the region.
Although Russia heavily stresses the civilian use of such bases, the reality is that the region is becoming more fortified with advanced weapon systems. This includes the deployment of long-range S-300 and S-400 missiles; medium-range P-800 Onik’s systems; short-range Pantsir and Tor M2-DT systems; and coastal defence systems such as the K-300P Bastion- P and 4K51 Rubezh. These military systems and bases played a vital part during Russia’s Zapad-2025 military exercises, which role-played both offensive and defensive scenarios and were heavily broadcast on Russian media. Notably, the Olenya Air Base, located in Russia’s Northern Murmansk region, has been utilised for the holding of Tu-95MS and Tu- 22M3 strategic bombers and has been one of the main bases for Russian aerospace forces during Moscow’s massive missile campaigns on Ukraine, further highlighting the militarisation occurring close to the Arctic.
A trend is clear: Russia’s military capacity in the area is expanding. Since 2008, Russia has reactivated more than 50 Soviet-era military outposts and significantly enhanced the capabilities of the Northern Fleet based near Murmansk. This fleet currently includes approximately 40 ice-class vessels and 32 submarines, supported by over 20 refurbished or newly constructed airfields north of the Arctic Circle. Whilst Russia’s 2035 strategy does not explicitly emphasise conflict or militarisation, it does highlight the region as essential for “Russian sovereignty and security”, with the increased presence suggesting a shift from sole economic priorities to military dominance. The dual-use nature of Russia’s infrastructure creates a permanent A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) bubble that threatens NATO’s northern flank and the security of undersea data cables, which have already been under threat.
The Northern Sea Route (NSR): A Sovereign Maritime Artery
Central to Moscow’s ambitions in the Arctic is the control and operation of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a 6,000 km shipping lane that Moscow asserts falls under its full sovereign jurisdiction. Russia’s ES-2035 envisages the expansion of the Arctic’s role in overall Russian crude and condensate production from 17.3 per cent in 2018 to 20 per cent in 2024, 23 per cent in 2030 and 26 per cent in 2035. The commercial significance of this route is growing rapidly; according to the CSIS Arctic Military Tracker (2024), cargo traffic along the NSR rose from 1.7 million tonnes in 2010 to 26 million tonnes in 2023.
Russian narratives about the Arctic and the NSR are carefully engineered and tightly synchronised across state media platforms, portraying itself as the rightful steward of the Arctic, a status justified by its long-standing presence, superior polar navigation expertise, and self-declared commitment to sustainable development. Central to this narrative is the economic promise of the NSR, marketed as both a strategic shipping corridor and a global commerce. In doing so, justifying its increasing military presence whilst underplaying its ambitions in securing a dominant presence in the region. It is worth noting that Russia’s current cargo volume on the NSR is half of what is planned in its official documents, partly due to international sanctions and partly to its inability to develop successful icebreakers to support its ambitions. Faced with Western capital flight, Moscow has pivoted toward a strategic partnership with Beijing, integrating the NSR into China’s “Polar Silk Road” framework to bypass sanctions-related technological gaps. Although the success of the NSR has been framed as a vital part of Russia’s long-term economic strategy, it possibly masks its greater goal of military expansion in the Arctic. This holds when comparing its infrastructure development along the route against its substantial unequal military expansion.
Conclusion
While Russia’s Arctic ambitions remain bold, they should not be dismissed. Russia’s hybrid activity in the region has received far less attention than its campaigns in Europe, with the EU failing to update its Arctic policy after the Ukrainian invasion in 2022, despite Russia making clear plans and claims for the area. NATO and the EU should aim to prioritise establishing a strategy for the Northern and Arctic regions, projecting power and deterring escalation in the region, whilst combating the growing security threat.
Society of European Future 
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